Métodos Bayesianos para caracterizar el comportamiento legislativo del Senado colombiano en el periodo 2010 - 2014

dc.contributor.advisorSosa Martinez, Juan Camilo
dc.contributor.authorLuque Zabala, Carolina Maria
dc.contributor.corporatenameUniversidad Santo Tomásspa
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-22T17:13:55Z
dc.date.available2021-09-22T17:13:55Z
dc.date.issued2021-09-16
dc.descriptionEste trabajo aplica metodologías Bayesianas para caracterizar el comportamiento legislativo del Senado colombiano durante el periodo 2010–2014. El análisis se hace a través de las votaciones nominales plenarias de ésta cámara legislativa. Además, la conducta electoral parlamentaria se operacionaliza mediante la implementación del estimador unidimensional de punto ideal Bayesiano estándar por medio de algoritmos de cadenas de Markov Monte Carlo. Los resultados obtenidos proveen aportes principalmente en dos direcciones: dimensión del espacio político e identificación de legisladores pivote. El patrón que revelan los puntos ideales estimados sugiere un rasgo latente no ideológico (oposición–no oposición) subyacente a la votación de los diputados del Senado. Así, este trabajo además de proveer evidencia empírica para una mejor comprensión de la política legislativa en Colombia durante el periodo objeto de análisis, también ofrece herramientas metodológicas, teóricas y prácticas, para guiar el pre–procesamiento y análisis de datos de votación nominal en contextos de parlamentos desequilibrados (a diferencia del parlamento norteamericano), tomando como referencia el caso particular del Senado de Colombia.spa
dc.description.abstractThis work applies Bayesian methodologies to characterize the legislative behavior of the Colombian Senate during the 2010–2014 period. The analysis is done through the plenary roll-call votes of this legislative chamber. Furthermore, parliamentary electoral behavior is operationalized by implementing the one-dimensional standard Bayesian ideal point estimator by means of Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithms. The results mainly provide contributions in two directions: Political space dimensionality and pivotal legislators identification. Patterns revealed by the estimated ideal points suggest non–ideological latent trait (opposition–no opposition) underlying the vote of the Senate deputies. Thus, in addition to providing empirical evidence for a better understanding of legislative policy in Colombia during the period under analysis, this work also offers methodological, theoretical, and practical tools to guide the pre-processing and analysis of roll-call data in contexts of unbalanced parliaments (as opposed to the North American parliament), taking as a reference the particular case of the Colombian’s Senate.spa
dc.description.degreelevelMaestríaspa
dc.description.degreenameMagister en Estadística Aplicadaspa
dc.description.domainhttp://unidadinvestigacion.usta.edu.cospa
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citationLuque, C. (2021). Métodos Bayesianos para caracterizar el comportamiento legislativo del Senado colombiano en el periodo 2010–2014 (Tesis de maestría). Universidad Santo Tomás, Bogotá, Colombia.spa
dc.identifier.instnameinstname:Universidad Santo Tomásspa
dc.identifier.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad Santo Tomásspa
dc.identifier.repourlrepourl:https://repository.usta.edu.cospa
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11634/35664
dc.language.isospa
dc.publisherUniversidad Santo Tomásspa
dc.publisher.branchCRAI-USTA Bogotáspa
dc.publisher.facultyFacultad de Estadísticaspa
dc.publisher.programMaestría Estadística Aplicadaspa
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dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia
dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.localAbierto (Texto Completo)spa
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/
dc.subject.keywordMarkov Chain Monte Carlo methodsspa
dc.subject.keywordBayesian ideal point estimatorspa
dc.subject.keywordRoll-call votesspa
dc.subject.keywordLegislative behaviorspa
dc.subject.keywordUnbalanced parliaments.spa
dc.subject.lembEstadística Bayesianaspa
dc.subject.lembEstadísticaspa
dc.subject.lembDecisiones estadísticasspa
dc.subject.lembTeoría Bayesiana de Decisiones Estadísticasspa
dc.subject.proposalMétodos de cadenas de Markov Monte Carlospa
dc.subject.proposalEstimador de punto ideal Bayesianospa
dc.subject.proposalVotaciones nominalesspa
dc.subject.proposalComportamiento legislativospa
dc.subject.proposalParlamentos desequilibradosspa
dc.titleMétodos Bayesianos para caracterizar el comportamiento legislativo del Senado colombiano en el periodo 2010 - 2014spa
dc.typemaster thesis
dc.type.categoryFormación de Recurso Humano para la Ctel: Trabajo de grado de Maestríaspa
dc.type.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_bdcc
dc.type.coarversionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa
dc.type.driveinfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
dc.type.localTesis de maestríaspa
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion

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