Autonomía de la voluntad en la era de la neurociencia y la neurotecnología: reconstrucción del concepto de la fuerza como vicio del consentimiento

Abstract

This article examines the sufficiency of the Colombian civil law framework to protect contractual consent against potential interferences arising from neuroscience and neurotechnologies. Based on the study of Article 1508 of the Colombian Civil Code and the classical conception of duress as a defect of consent, it analyzes how neurotechnologies capable of recording or modulating brain activity may condition, modify, or restrict an individual’s determination.

The article addresses concepts of neuroscience, neurotechnology techniques, comparative law analysis, and data protection in order to argue that the emergence of neurotechnology requires broadening the current conceptualization of contractual consent and, in particular, of duress as a defect of consent.

The analysis concludes that the inclusion of neurorights does not require the creation of a new category of fundamental rights. On the contrary, protection may be achieved through the explicit constitutional principle of human dignity, which makes it possible to safeguard autonomy of the will and guarantee the validity of contractual consent in scenarios where neurotechnologies have the potential to influence, modify, or condition decision-making.