La contratación en el régimen especial del Estado descentralizado: eficiencia operativa y privatización silenciosa del erario

Abstract

The article examines public procurement under the special regimes applicable to decentralized entities in Colombia and the tension that arises between the pursuit of operational efficiency and the risks of a silent privatization of public funds. Drawing on the Political Constitution of Colombia, it analyzes how contractual flexibility afforded to entities subject to special regimes may enhace public administration, while at the same time undermining transparency, fiscal oversight, and the principle of legality governing public expenditure. The article proposes an operational definition of silent privatization. Through an examination of the special legal regimes governing decentralized public entities, it demonstrates how exceptions to the ordinary public procurement framework may create gray areas of accountability and legal responsibility. The article advances a framework for balancing institutional autonomy with effective oversight, strengthening the transparency and fiscal accountability obligations of decentralized public entities, and preventing procurement under special legal regimes from becoming a mechanism for the covert transfer of public resources to private interests associated with such entities, depending on the scope and intensity of the applicable special regime.