Parte 1: el problema de la agencia. Capitulo 2: Agencia eidética: agencia material, artefactos y agentes eidéticos
| dc.contributor.author | Fonseca Martínez, Miguel Antonio | spa |
| dc.contributor.corporatename | Universidad Santo Tomas | spa |
| dc.contributor.cvlac | https://scienti.minciencias.gov.co/cvlac/visualizador/generarCurriculoCv.do?cod_rh=0000774758 | spa |
| dc.coverage.campus | CRAI-USTA Bogotá | spa |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-03-23T14:43:42Z | spa |
| dc.date.available | 2021-03-23T14:43:42Z | spa |
| dc.date.issued | 2020 | spa |
| dc.description | En sentido amplio un agente es un ser que tiene la capacidad de actuar, y la agencia es la manifestación de tal capacidad. Actuar puede ser definido de forma negativa como aquello que hacemos a diferencia de aquello que nos pasa (Wilson y Shpall, 2016). Sin embargo, es en cierto sentido muy difícil entender la delgada línea roja que limita una simple actividad controlada de una actividad controlada y dirigida. Por estos motivos, la filosofía contemporánea ha descrito y analizado dicho fenómeno desde dos perspectivas, a saber, aquella que concibe la acción fundamentada en el concepto de intencionalidad, denominada también teoría estándar de la acción, y, por otro lado, la concepción según la cual existe la posibilidad de adscribir agencia genuina a seres carentes de intencionalidad (Schlosser, 2015) | spa |
| dc.description.abstract | In a broad sense an agent is a being that has the capacity to act, and agency is the manifestation of such capacity. Acting can be defined negatively as that which we do as opposed to that which happens to us (Wilson and Shpall, 2016). However, it is in a sense very difficult to understand the thin red line that limits a simple controlled activity from a controlled and directed activity. For these reasons, contemporary philosophy has described and analyzed this phenomenon from two perspectives, namely, the one that conceives action based on the concept of intentionality, also called standard theory of action, and, on the other hand, the conception according to which there is the possibility of ascribing genuine agency to beings lacking intentionality (Schlosser, 2015). | spa |
| dc.description.domain | http://unidadinvestigacion.usta.edu.co | spa |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | spa |
| dc.identifier.citation | Fonseca , M.(2020). Tecnología, agencia y transhumanismo Bogotá: Universidad Santo Tomás. | spa |
| dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.15332/dt.inv.2019.02499 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11634/33162 | |
| dc.relation.annexed | http://repository.usta.edu.co/handle/11634/23178 | spa |
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| dc.rights | Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia | * |
| dc.rights.coar | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/ | * |
| dc.subject.keyword | Humanism | spa |
| dc.subject.keyword | Phenomenology | spa |
| dc.subject.keyword | Philosophy of technology | spa |
| dc.subject.keyword | Technology | spa |
| dc.subject.keyword | Epistemology of pedagogy | spa |
| dc.subject.keyword | Communicative epistemology | spa |
| dc.subject.keyword | Heidegger, Martin 1889-1976 - Criticism and Interpretation | spa |
| dc.subject.proposal | Humanismo | spa |
| dc.subject.proposal | Fenomenología | spa |
| dc.subject.proposal | Filosofía de la tecnología | spa |
| dc.subject.proposal | Tecnología | spa |
| dc.subject.proposal | Epistemología de la pedagogía | spa |
| dc.subject.proposal | Epistemología comunicativa | spa |
| dc.subject.proposal | Heidegger, Martín 1889-1976 – Crítica e interpretación | spa |
| dc.title | Parte 1: el problema de la agencia. Capitulo 2: Agencia eidética: agencia material, artefactos y agentes eidéticos | spa |
| dc.type.category | Generación de Nuevo Conocimiento: Libro resultado de investigación | spa |
