La simpatía moral como fundamento para la sociabilidad humana en David Hume

Abstract

This paper shows how sympathy, as a moral sentiment in Hume, is a fundamental aspect of human sociability. The monograph is composed of two chapters: the first discusses that sympathy is a moral principle that allows communicating desires, affections and emotions; and the second argues that sympathy is, indeed, a fundamental mode for human sociability. The theoretical reference from which this paper was based is based on moral philosophy, precisely in response to the idea of examining how sympathy is a fundamental aspect of human sociability. The degree work, also, in the framework of documentary research, is supported by some assertions of Hume's works such as the Treatise of Human Nature (1739/1977) , An Inquiry on Human Nature (1751/1968) and the Dissertation on passions (1757/2012) , as well as contributions of scholars of moral philosophy such as the Colombian philosopher Angela Calvo and the Spanish philosopher Victoria Camps.