El juicio oral: Racionalidad probatoria, control del poder punitivo y garantías estructurales del proceso acusatorio

Abstract

The criminal trial, far from being a mere procedural stage for the presentation of evidence, constitutes the core of juridicity within the accusatorial process: the point where the tension between the State’s punitive power and fundamental rights reaches its greatest intensity. This article examines the trial as a dialectical mechanism of control over punishment, in which each phase - the opening statements, evidentiary debate, cross-examination, objections, and closing arguments - responds to a rational architecture grounded in immediacy, contradiction, and strict adherence to due process. From this perspective, the oral trial is not a forum for emotional persuasion or mere procedural efficiency, but rather a space for the legitimation of ius puniendi subjected to epistemic rules and constitutional constraints. Only a trial that consistently articulates probative rationality and the absolute respect for fundamental guarantees can fulfill its role within a Democratic State governed by the rule of law: not serving the mechanical imposition of punishment, but rather the permanent reaffirmation of the limits of penal power.